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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARCELENE PIERCE WEHRY, ] 
Plaintiff | 
Respondent, ] 
vs. ] 
TERRY RAY PIERCE, ] 
Defendant ] 
Appellant, ] 
i Appeals No. 890239-CA 
) Civil No. 814900255 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction for the above captioned matter is 
conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from Third District Court, Judge 
Michael Murphy's denial of the Defendant's Petition for 
Modification for Change of Custody of the two minor children of 
the parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the Court err in its finding at the Petition 
for Modification Hearing that there is no substantial change of 
circumstances which would justify a consideration of a change in 
custody? 
2. Did the Court err in failing to make sufficiently 
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detailed Findings of Fact with regard its analysis of whether 
there was a substantial change of circumstances? 
3. Did the Court err in its finding that even if there 
was a substantial change in circumstances, it would not be in the 
best interest of the minor children of the parties to change 
custody from their mother to their father? 
3. Did the Court err in failing to sustain counselfs 
objection to hearsay evidence being presented? 
4, Did the Court err in denying the Defendant's Motion 
for Amendment of Findings of Fact? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a final order of the court denying 
the Defendant Appellant's Petition of Modification and from a 
final order of the court denying the Defendant Appellant's Motion 
to Amend Findings. The relevant facts are as follows: 
1. The parties were divorced on September 4, 1981. 
Decree of Divorce. 
2. Two boys were born during the marriage: Isaac 
Pierce born July 7, 1978, and Isaiah Pierce born September 7, 
1980. Decree of Divorce. 
3. Custody of the two boys was awarded in a default 
proceeding to the Plaintiff. Decree of Divorce. 
4. The Plaintiff and children lived in Utah until 
January of 1985, at which time she moved to Reno, Nevada without 
prior notice to the Defendant, and without revealing her or the 
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children's whereabouts to the Defendant. The Defendant located 
her by driving to Reno and observing her car at her parentsf 
residence. Defendant hired a lawyer who verified through the 
children's school records that the boys were residing in Reno. 
The Plaintiff initiated no contacts with the Defendant until the 
Defendant brought a Petition for Modification seeking custody of 
the boys in 1985. Trial Transcript 55-56, 140. 
5. The Court denied the Petition for Modification, but 
awarded substantial summer visitation. Order on Petition for 
Modification. 
6. In May of 1986, the Plaintiff requested the older 
boy, Isaac, come to live with the Defendant who had since 
remarried his present wife, Letha Pierce. Isaac lived with the 
Defendant from May 1986 until November of 1987 save a summer 
visit in the summer of 1987. Trial Transcript, Page 145. 
7. In August of 1987, at the request of the younger 
boy, Isaiah Pierce, the Plaintiff signed a stipulation agreeing 
to change physical custody of both boys from herself to the 
Defendant from July 1987 until July 1988. Stipulation. 
8. Both parties petitioned the court for an order 
changing custody based upon their stipulation, which the court 
refused to do, instead granting "extended visitation" to the 
Defendant. Minute Entry. 
9. In November of 1987, without any prior notice, the 
Defendant and his wife became aware that the Plaintiff intended 
to remove the boys from the Defendant's physical custody, and 
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move them back to California where the Plaintiff and her husband 
lived at the time. Trial Transcript, Pages 165-169. 
10. The Plaintiff declined to provide her phone number 
to the Defendant after she removed the boys from his physical 
custody. Trial Transcript, Page 202. 
11. The boys were sent to visit the Defendant during 
the summer of 1988, and during this time the Defendant petitioned 
the court for a change of custody. Petition for Modification. 
12. A hearing was held on the Petition for Modifica-
tion on January 8. The Defendant's Petition was denied and this 
appeal resulted. Order on Petition for Modification. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court ruled that there was not a substantial 
change of circumstances which justified considering a change of 
custody. This was against the clear weight of the evidence and 
was in error since the evidence presented at trial brought forth 
many facts which supported a finding of a change of circumstances 
under Utah law. The most important change of circumstances was 
the Plaintiff's relinquishment of physical custody of the minor 
children to the Defendant for an extended period of time, then 
her removal of the children from the Defendant without prior 
warning. The Plaintiff also demonstrated instability in numerous 
moves, and deliberate refusal to provide her phone number to the 
Defendant to allow him to contact the children by phone. The 
evidence also showed that the oldest boy was mature for his age, 
and that he showed a strong desire to live with his father, which 
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the custody evaluator found to be in the best interests of both 
boys. 
The court also ruled that even if there was a change of 
circumstances, it would not be in the best interests of the 
children to change custody because of the younger boy's fear of 
his stepmother. This was error, and against the clear weight of 
the evidence since the only evidence of the younger child's fear 
was that it occurred subsequent to the Defendant's Petition for 
Modification and was the result of "programming" on the part of 
the Plaintiff. The youngest child, himself, asked to live with 
the Defendant and his stepmother in 1987, and he demonstrated no 
fear to the custody evaluator or to the Defendant's and 
Plaintiff's witnesses who had observed the youngest child with 
the stepmother on numerous occasions. In light of the custody 
evaluator's recommendation of a change of custody, it was against 
the clear weight of the evidence to find that it was not in the 
best interests of the children to change custody to the 
Defendant. 
In addition, the trial court failed to make adequate 
findings articulating his basis for finding no substantial change 
of circumstances. The Court failed to discuss the prior award of 
custody and it did not compare those findings with the evidence 
presented at the hearing. Therefore the findings are inadequate 
as a matter of law. 
The court also erred in allowing prejudicial hearsay 
evidence to be admitted over the objections of Defendants 
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counsel. This testimony presented unfair surprise to the 
Defendant who was unable to cross-examine the witnesses referred 
to by the Plaintiff. There was no showing that the witnesses 
were unavailable to testify in person. 
Finally, the court erred in denying the Defendant's 
Motion to Amend the Findings. The Defendant's Motion to Amend 
was based upon statements made by the judge in his ruling that 
neither parent had committed abuse of the children or of step 
children or foster children. The Plaintiff did not object to 
this paragraph in the* Defendant's proposed Findings, and 
therefore the judge should have granted the Defendant's Motion to 
Amend the Findings to allow addition of these findings in 
conformance with his ruling. Also, the Plaintiff included many 
paragraphs in her Findings which were not supported by the weight 
of the evidence and which were not part of the judge's ruling, 
Therefore it was error to deny the Defendant's Motion to Amend 
the Findings. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING 
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence on 
the Defendant Appellant's Motion for Petition for Modification 
for Change of Custody of the two minor children of the parties, 
the court found that the Defendant had failed to show substantial 
change of circumstances with regard to the situation of the 
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parties which would allow him to consider a custody change. In 
recent years, the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals 
have articulated the specific types of changes which must exist 
for the court to consider a change of custody. This requirement 
is to protect the child from "ping-pong" custody awards and the 
"accompanying instability so damaging to a child's proper 
development." Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624, 626 (Utah 1987). 
The threshold for finding a change of circumstances is high "to 
discourage frequent petitions for modification of custody 
decrees." Id. The case of Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608 (Utah 
1984) delineated the specific changes which may be considered as 
a change of circumstances; in the Becker case the court held that 
changes in the noncustodial parent's situation should not be 
considered a "substantial change of circumstances" for 
modification of custody. Id. at 610. 
Concurring opinions of Justice Stewart and Howe in the 
Kramer case, however, cautioned the court that a strict 
application of the Kramer analysis would in some circumstances 
result in decisions which would be contrary to the best interests 
of the child. Kramer at 629. Justice Stewart's and Howefs 
concurring opinions in Kramer have been heeded in recent case 
law, such as Fullmer v. Fullmer. 761 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1988)e 
The case of Mauahan v. Maughan. 770 P. 2d 156 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), however, held that in situations where custody was 
not carefully examined in the first instance, a less rigid change 
of circumstances inquiry is allowed, and the court may accept a 
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greater range of evidence under Hogge's first prong, including 
"the events which transpired since the original award," and the 
"resulting effects on the child." Maughan at 160. 
In light of the proliferating standards for 
determining whether there has been a change of circumstances, it 
must first be determined which standard is the appropriate 
standard to apply in a petition for modification case—the rigid 
Kramer standard which limits the asserted changes to be 
considered to 
...those which have some material relationship to and 
substantial €>ffect on the parenting ability of the 
functioning of the presently existing custodial 
relationship... 
Kramer at 626 quoting Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982), 
or the less restrictive standard set forth in the Maughan case. 
It is submitted that in the case at bar, the Maughan standard is 
more appropriate for the reason that the minor children involved 
have been subjected to "ping-pong" custody arrangements by the 
Plaintiff herself when she voluntarily sent the oldest son, Isaac 
to live with the Defendant for the 86-87 school year, agreed in 
writing that both boys would remain with their father for an 
additional year, and then contrary to her agreement, removed both 
children from the custody of the Defendant without warning in the 
middle of the school year. It was precisely this ping-pong 
physical custody arrangement, along with the strong desires of 
the oldest child, which motivated the Defendant to seek a change 
in custody. To change custody from the Plaintiff to the 
Defendant is quite a different situation where the children have 
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previously spent extended periods of time with the Defendant, and 
where the Plaintiff had voluntarily agreed to such arrangements. 
Another grounds for finding that the Maughan standard 
rather than the Kramer standard is applicable to the case at bar 
is that the prior petition for modification brought by the 
Defendant did not result in findings indicating that the court 
thoroughly examined various factors pertaining to the childrenfs 
welfare. The fact that no findings were made with regard to the 
children's best interests allows a wider range of evidence under 
Hoggefs first prong regarding "the initial custody arrangement, 
the events that have since transpired, and the resulting effects 
on the child." Maughan at 160. 
A third ground for applying a more relaxed standard to 
the substantial change of circumstances requirement is submitted 
by the Defendant for the reason that it would serve the best 
interests of the children of divorce to expand the Kramer 
standard to cases involving changes in circumstances which 
affect the children's access to and relationship with their non-
custodial parent. Too often a vindictive custodial parent, 
secure in the knowledge that district courts rarely find a 
custodial parent in contempt for failure to allow visitation, 
systematically refuse visitation, campaign to alienate the 
children from their noncustodial parent, and make their living 
arrangements such that geographical distance and will prevent 
frequent visitation. 
A custodial parent's behavior in attempting to 
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restrict visitation, whether by refusal to allow visitation or by 
simply moving away from the noncustodial parent, is a change of 
circumstances which drastically affects the child's well-being. 
Research has clearly demonstrated the importance of the childfs 
access to both parents after divorce* Children of divorce are at 
a higher risk for suicide, juvenile delinquency, teenage 
pregnancy, failure in school, and health problems• U.S. News & 
World Report, November 28, 1983 pgs. 57-62. The single most 
important factor which has been found to alleviate the pain and 
stress children experience in a divorce situeition has been found 
to be regular and frequent contact with both parents. See 
Jacobson, The Impact of Marital Separation/Divorce on Children, 1 
J. Divorce 341 (1978), which documents a study finding "the 
higher the loss of time with the father, the higher the 
maladjustment of the child." Id. at 339. See also B. Garfinkel 
and H. Golombek, The Adolescent and Mood Disturbance, 2 04, 2 05. 
(1983), E.M. Heatherington, Effects of Father Absence on 
Personality Development in Adolescent Daughters, Developmental 
Psychology Vol. 7, pgs. 313-326 (1972), H. Biller, Father and Sex 
Role (1971), and J. Cortes, Delinquency and Crime, A 
Biopsychosocial Approach. (1972). 
One of the longest range studies ever done on the 
effects of divorce upon children, was a ten year study in 
California which found that the only children who were relatively 
happy following their parent's divorce, were those who could 
visit their noncustodial parent daily with the approval and 
13 
permission of their custodial parent. L. Francke, Growing up 
Divorced, (1983). Another five year study of children of divorce 
found that "regular, frequent visitation" with the noncustodial 
parent was the "key factor" contributing to the success of 
children of divorce. J. Wallerstein and J. Kelly, Surviving the 
Breakup, page 328,(1980). This same study determined that 
approximately one fifth of the custodial parents participating in 
the study saw no value in visitation and actively tried to 
sabotage the child's visits with the noncustodial parent. Id. In 
light of the well-documented importance of contact between the 
child and the noncustodial parent, the custodial parent's actions 
in attempting to thwart frequent and regular contact with the 
noncustodial parent must be considered in any determination of a 
change of circumstances in order to fully protect the children of 
divorce in Utah. Therefore, this court should modify the 
standards set forth in Maughan to include the custodial parentf s 
actions in facilitating or thwarting visitation as evidence to be 
considered a substantial change of circumstances. 
Here, the evidence at trial revealed many facts which 
under Utah case law constitute a change of circumstances even 
under the more restrictive Kramer standards. 
First of all, the undisputed evidence presented at the 
hearing on the Petition for Modification was that the two minor 
boys involved in this case had been subject to numerous moves 
and school transfers since the entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
Mrs. Wehry testified that since the date of the Decree of 
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Divorce, the oldest child, Isaac, had attended 7 schools—2 in 
Salt Lake City, 3 in Reno, 1 in Eureka, and 1 in Chico. Since 
the Petition for Modification, he attended 5 schools—3 in Reno, 
1 in Eureka, and 1 in Chico. Testimony of Marcelene Wehry, page 
194, lines 5-8. Ms. Wehry was unable to provide stability in the 
children's environment, necessarily forcing them to abandon 
friendships and familiar circumstances. She was unable to 
provide continuity in their education environment subjecting them 
to different curriculums, and on at least one occasion, as set 
forth below, forcing them to change schools in the middle of the 
school year. 
In addition to the numerous moves on the part of 
the Plaintiff, the parties agreed to a physical change in custody 
for Isaac for the 86-87 school year, and then a physical change 
in custody for Isaiah so that both boys would reside with their 
father in 87-88. Just three months after the boys were enrolled 
in school in Utah and pursuant to the stipulation giving 
Defendant custody of both boys for the year of 87-88, the 
Plaintiff removed the boys from their father in an abrupt, 
unplanned, and unnecessary custody change, totally without notice 
or warning to the Defendant and to the children. The court-
ordered custody evaluator, Dr. Lewis Morse testified that such a 
move would have a destabilizing effect upon the children as seen 
from the following quote: 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to 
whether it had a positive or a 
negative effect on the boys for the 
Wherys [sic] to send the boys to 
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live in Utah, and then remove them 
a few months later with no warning? 
A. In my opinion, I would think that 
that would have an unstabilizing 
and confusing effect on the boys. 
Testimony of Dr. Lewis Morse, Pages 22-23. 
The case of Hirsch v. Hirsch, 725 P.2d 1320, 1321 
(Utah 1986) dealt with a situation where the noncustodial parent 
had assumed physical custody of the child for a majority of the 
time since the divorce. The custodial parent had moved seven 
times since the decree was entered and did not exhibit the same 
stability the noncustodial parent demonstrated. The Utah 
Supreme Court found that failure to assume the role of custodial 
parent was a material change of circumstances which warrants the 
reopening of the question of custody, particularly when the 
noncustodial parent provided the child with a permanent 
residence and stable home life. Id. 
The case at bar is very similar to the Hirsch case. In 
this case, as set forth above, the Plaintiff voluntarily 
relinquished custody to the noncustodial parent, splitting up the 
children for one year, and then agreeing to relinquish custody of 
both children for another year. She then removed the children 
from the Defendant's care, without warning, subjecting the 
children to much instability in conjunction with her many 
relocations of the childrens1 residence. The Defendant, on the 
other hand, offered the children stability and a chance to 
enhance the close bond that existed between the children and 
their father and his family. Under the Hirsch case the court 
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below clearly erred in finding no substantial change of 
circumstances. 
The Plaintiff also testified that after removing the 
boys unexpectedly from their father in November of 1987, she 
changed her phone number. It was her intention to deprive the 
Pierces of her phone number from November of 1987 until June of 
1988. This prevented the Pierces from having contact with the 
minor children of the parties. Testimony of Marcelene Pierce, 
page 193, lines 3-9. This action on the part of the Plaintiff 
prevented the Defendant from initiating calls to his sons, and 
unnecessarily restricted the boys' telephone contact with their 
father. The court itself, after reviewing the telephone records, 
questioned the Plaintiff as to why no calls were made to the 
children's father in the month of May, 1988 in the following 
exchange: 
Q. Why were there no phone calls made 
to Mr. Pierce in May of 88. There 
were no phone calls made to--
A. Probably because I didn't encourage 
the children to call. I don't 
know. 
Q, Why didn't you encourage them to 
call? 
A. I don't know. They were leaving on 
June 20th and we had arranged for 
visitation to begin that day. I 
don't know why there were no calls 
in May, I was kind of surprised 
when I looked at the bill myself. 
Testimony of Marcelene Wehry, pages 202, 203. 
The Plaintiff's behavior in this instance demonstrated 
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irresponsibility and disregard for the best interests of the 
children. In light of the large body of research documenting the 
importance of contact between children and their non-custodial 
parent, this court should find, as a matter of law, that a 
custodial parent's attempts to restrict contact should be 
considered to reflect her parenting ability and the functioning 
of the custodial relationship. 
While moving numerous times alone may not be sufficient 
to justify a change of circumstances, a change of custody for 
over a year, which separated the minor children of the parties, a 
plan to reunite the children in the physical custody of their 
father and then disruption of that plan with no warning, is 
certainly a change of circumstances justifying review of 
custody. The fact that the boys have moved often and that there 
was a substantial period of time when the boys were denied calls 
initiated by their father because of the Plaintiff decision to 
deprive Defendant from having her telephone number, compounds 
the difficulties for the boys and clearly establishes a change of 
circumstances. 
A second change of circumstances which should have been 
recognized by the court as a substantial change of circumstances 
was the fact that Isaac wanted to live with his father for 
several years, and at the time of the Petition for Modification 
he had experienced the opportunity to live with his father for a 
year, and had attained a sufficient degree of maturity, both 
emotional and chronological, to appreciate the consequences of a 
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permanent change of custody. In this case, the court-ordered 
custody evaluator testified that Isaac had firmly stated his 
desire to live with his father. Testimony of Dr. Louis Morse, 
page 15, lines 20-22. He also testified that Isaac was mature 
for his age, was intelligent and creative. 
Id, page 16, lines 5-7. 
The custody evaluator expanded upon his perception of 
Isaac's desire to live with his father when he testified as 
follows: 
Now Isaac has been adamant about 
living with his father for two 
reasons: one is the person of the 
father and the personal relation-
ship between him and his father 
and the lifestyle of his father. 
The lifestyle of the father is 
rural, and he prefers to have a 
rural lifestyle himself. 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to which 
element is stronger in Isaac's 
preference* to live with his father? 
A. Well, he made many statements 
regarding his relationship—many 
positive statements regarding his 
relationship with his father. The 
most positive one is the one I put 
into the report, where he said, "I 
love my father more than anybody 
else on earth." 
Testimony of Dr. Louis Morse, page 20, lines 11-2 3. 
The evidence also indicated that forcing Isaac to 
return to his mother against his will affected him in such a 
negative way as to cause him physical pain. Isaac's stepmother 
testified of the following event which occurred at the time 
Isaac was to return from his extended summer visitation with his 
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father: 
...I says to Isaac, I says, "come 
on, letfs go." And he started 
doubling with pain and started 
crying and he said his stomach 
hurt and he didn't want to go. And 
I had to sit with him on the front 
steps for about 15 minutes with my 
arm around him. And I was rubbing 
his back and telling him that this 
would be okay, and that he was 
strong and that he would get 
through this. And we got into the 
car and we picked up my sister and 
my nephew and we went to 
California. 
Testimony of Letha Pierce, page 120, lines 22-25, and page 121, 
lines 1-6. 
The Utah Supreme Court case of Finnecran v. Finnegan, 
535 P. 2d 1159 (Utah 1975) found that a mature childfs desire to 
change physical custody justified a change in custody to allow 
the child to live with the parent of his choice. 
Under Utah case law, and in light of the testimony at 
the hearing, the court erred in finding that there was no 
substantial change of circumstances. 
II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT IT WAS IN THE 
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN TO REMAIN WITH 
THEIR MOTHER BECAUSE OF ISAIAH'S FEAR OF HIS 
STEPMOTHER. 
Having found there was no substantial change of 
circumstances, the Court ruled that even if there were found to 
be a substantial change of circumstances, it would not be in the 
best interests of the children to change custody stating the 
following reasons: 
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. . .it's my belief based on the evidence 
that I heard and the interviews with the 
children that it still would not be in the 
best interest of the children to change 
custody if for no other reason that this: 
Isaiah's feelings about his step-mother may 
not be justified^ but he has those feelings, 
nevertheless, and thates fairly clear from 
the interview with him* It seems to me that 
based on the evidence and based on the 
interviews, that Isaac would be better able 
to adapt to the proposition that he cannot be 
with his father as the custodial parent 
better than Isaiah could adapt to being away 
from his mother as the custodial parent. 
Both sets of parents and step-parents 
need to work with Isaiah on this. 
And I'm not seeing anything negatively, 
Mr. Pierce, but not only the clear impression 
I got, but expressly from Isaac, not from 
Isaiah but from Isaac, that he has the 
feeling that maybe Isaiah is not picked on 
exactly, but there is more discipline from 
Letha with respect to Isaiah than there is 
with respect to him. And that's because it's 
his belief that he is so associated with you 
that the discipline in your house with 
respect to Isaac is your discipline, not 
Letha's. 
And he thinks that is not the case with 
respect to Isaiah, and the way it comes out 
is this, he says, that, "If Letha did 
anything with me, my dad would step in. But 
it's not the same with respect to Isaiah." 
You know, I'm sure that your effort is 
that when the children are with you to have 
even-handed justice, and I assume that's what 
occurs. But their perception of it is not 
that way, and I'm not so concerned with Isaac 
because he sees what he sees and he is 
willing to say it. But Isaiah did not say 
that, but it may be what he is thinking and 
never expressing it. It's just a problem 
that ought to be addressed. 
Ruling of the Court, pages 3-4. 
From this speech, the Court's reasoning with regard to 
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the best interests of the children is not easily discerned, but 
the salient points seem to be that the younger child, Isaiah 
Pierce, was afraid of his stepmother, and because of this Isaac 
would be better able to adjust to not living with his father than 
Isaiah would be able to adjust to not living with his mother. 
Although the court mention "disparate treatment" of the two boys, 
he also said "Ifm sure that your effort is that when the 
children are with you to have even-handed justice, and I assume 
that's what occurs." Id, (Emphasis added.) This statement 
indicates that he did not believe disparate treatment actually 
occurred, apparently leaving the issues of Isaiah's fear as the 
only reason why he did not feel it was in the childrens' best 
interests to have custody transferred to their father. The 
court's finding that the best interests of the Pierce children 
required that custody remain with their mother because of 
Isaiah's fear was against the clear weight of the evidence, as 
can be seen by examination of the testimony of the various 
witnesses, including the Plaintiff's witness, and the Plaintiff's 
own testimony. 
The court-ordered evaluator interviewed the children 
the day he testified in trial, and testified that Isaiah's fear 
of Letha was the result of "programming" by the Plaintiff and her 
husband rather than upon fact: 
My interpretation of this 
entire situation is that while 
Isaiah says, "I am scared to be in 
Utah to be with Letha," that that 
fright is not based on fact, and I 
believe both families in this case 
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have tried to influence the 
children to their point of view. 
And I think that at least part, in 
my opinion, of his impression of 
being afraid of Letha is due to the 
influence that he receives from his 
parents in Chico [the Plaintiff and 
her husband]c 
Testimony of Dr. Lewis Morse, page 17, lines 14-21. 
The custody evaluator, Dr. Morse, expanded upon his 
basis for believing that Isaiah's fear was not based on fact in 
the following exchange. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
What is the basis for that 
opinion, 
Say it again please? 
What is the basis for your 
opinion, that part of his 
fright is based upon the 
influence of the Chico family? 
By all accounts the boy is 
immature. His mother in Chico 
stated expressly that he is 
moldable and he changes his 
story according to the 
circumstances. And he has—you 
know, he has lied to me. 
Can you think of a specific example 
of what he has lied to you about? 
Yes. In Chico I asked him, 
"Does your mother ever refuse 
to let you call your father on 
the phone?" And he said, 
"yes*" I asked him the same 
question this morning, and he 
said, "No." So in one of those 
cases he was not telling me 
the truth. 
Id. at pages 17-18. 
Dr. Morse took into consideration Isaiah's fear of his 
stepmother in recommending what custody arrangement would best 
serve the interests of the Pierce boys. He testified that because 
Isaiah's fear was not substantiated and was not in proportion to 
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reality, he was still of the opinion that it would serve the 
best interests of the boys to be placed in the custody of their 
father. Testimony of Dr. Morse, page 41, lines 1-5. 
Other facts and statements by witnesses leave no other 
conclusion but that Isaiahfs fear was based upon "programming" by 
the Plaintiff rather than being based upon reality. 
Probably the strongest indication of the fact that 
Isaiah's fear was not based on reality is his statement to the 
custody evaluator during summer visitation, that he wanted to 
live with his father. It was not until he returned to live with 
his mother that his fear was first expressed, and he then 
changed his mind and stated he wanted to live with his mother. 
Isaiah, the younger boy, when I 
interviewed him in Eureka, he opted 
for living with his father. When I 
interviewed him in Chico, he opted 
to live with his mother. Today 
when I saw him briefly, he said he 
wished to live with his mother. 
Testimony of Dr. Louis Morse, page 15, lines 20-25, page 16, 
lines 1-2. 
Obviously, Isaiah's fears of his stepmother were not 
based on reality because at the time he was living in her care 
and physical custody for extended visitation of 60 days, he did 
not show any discomfort or fear whatsoever. When questioned at 
that time by the evaluator about his relationship with Letha, he 
stated he got along with Letha "pretty good." Testimony of Dr. 
Louis Morse, page 17, lines 10-13. 
The testimony of the Plaintiff herself establishes that 
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Isaiah had no fear of his father. It was the Plaintiff §s 
testimony that Isaiah came to her and asked her to go live with 
his father. Obviously he had no fear at that time of living with 
his father and stepmother. 
...Isaiah came to me and he said, 
"I want to go spend a year with 
dad." And I said, you know, I 
told them, well, I gave Isaac a 
year so I felt like I had to give 
Isaiah a year too. 
Testimony of Marcelene Wehry, page 145, lines 7-11. 
Many witnesses observed the interactions between Isaiah 
and his stepmother, Letha Pierce, including the Plaintiff's own 
witnesses who observed an easy-going, friendly, loving 
relationship between the boys and their st€>pmother without any 
indication of fear whatsoever. The Plaintiff's witness, Peggy Nc 
Rogers, testified that she had known Isaac and Isaiah for 9 
years. She testified that she had seen the boys interact with 
their stepmother and father and that, 
...They seem real happy with them, 
especially Isaac. Isaiah is just 
very fond of his mother and I think 
he is just a little bit uneasy with 
Letha just because he wants to be 
with his mother. But he is not, 
you know he is not—I don't feel 
like he feels like he is being 
threatened to the point of fear 
anything like that. 
Testimony of Peggy Rogers, Page 133. 
The Defendant testified that Isaicih's relationship was 
close to his stepmother: 
From what I see it's a very, ve^j 
close and loving relationship. 
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He's always running up to give her 
hugs and likes to cuddle up next to 
her# sit on her lap. Very close 
relationship. 
Testimony of Terry Pierce page 74, line 25, and page 75, lines 
1-3. 
Dr. Harold J. Shaw, Jr., a witness for the Defendant, 
who has a master's degree in Educational Administration and a 
doctor's degree in Educational Administration, and was principal 
of Tintic High School for 6 years, testified that he had been 
acquainted with Terry and Letha Pierce for 8 years. He testified 
that he had observed them in his capacity as community member, 
church member, and as principal of the school their daughter Amy 
attended. He testified that he observed them in school and at 
home at parties. "Just about every life situation you could have 
in the community." Testimony of Dr. Shaw, page 97, lines 2-24. 
Dr. Shaw testified that he observed Letha and Terry 
Pierce, Isaac and Isaiah, and that he observed, 
They played a lot. They had a good 
time. They had a warm and loving 
relationship. I think they like to 
cuddle up to Letha a lot in church. 
Testimony of Dr. Shaw, page 102, lines 1-7. 
The question was asked, did you ever see any evidence 
of Isaiah being afraid of Letha? Answer, "never, no." How many 
opportunities did you have to observe Letha and Isaiah together? 
Answer, "Oh, at least 20 or more." Testimony of Dr. Shaw, page 
102, lines 8-13. 
The Plaintiff did not produce one witness who could 
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testify, from personal experience, of fear existing on the part 
of Isaiah prior to the Petition for Modification of Custody 
Hearing, nor could she produce any witness who could testify, 
from personal experience, of any incident which would cause 
Isaiah to fear his stepmother. 
In conclusion, it can be seen that the Court's finding 
the best interest of the minor children mandated that they remain 
with their mother is against the clear weight of the evidencec 
Most importantly, it was contrary to the finding of the courts-
ordered custody evaluator who recommended that the best interest 
of the children would be served by giving permanent custody of 
them to their father. In addition, the court failed to examine 
the Findings of Fact rendered by the judge at the prior Petition 
for Modification. The case of Jensen v. Jensen, 775 P.2d 436 
(Ct. App. Utah 1989) requires that the court must discuss the 
evidence offered in support of a Petition for Modification of 
custody, and must compare the evidence with the factors 
underlying the original award. The court's comments from the 
bench in the modification hearing must explain the reasoning 
behind the denial of the petition. Id. , at 438. The court in 
that case failed to establish sufficient factual grounds to 
conclude whether a change of circumstances had been demonstrated. 
The case was remanded for articulation of the considerations 
behind the prior award of custody and the order denying 
modification. Id. at 439. 
The case at bar is identical to the Jensen case in its 
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lack of adequate findings. The court did not articulate the 
considerations behind the initial award of custody nor the order 
denying modification. Here, like the Jensen case, there are 
insufficient factual grounds expressed to conclude whether a 
change of circumstances has been demonstrated. 
III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING HEARSAY 
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT 
At the hearing on the Petition for Modification, the 
Plaintiff attempted to justify her removal of the two children 
from the Defendant's physical custody in contravention of the 
stipulation she entered granting the Defendant physical custody 
of the boys for a year. The Plaintiff testified of numerous 
conversations with various individuals, in which she claimed to 
have been told information which caused her to believe her 
children would be placed in foster care, therefore, necessitating 
her picking up the children. The Plaintiff testified to 
conversations with Dixie Trinkle. Testimony of Marcelene Wehry, 
pages 162-164, Bruce Schofied, Id. at pages 164-165, Mr. 
Grimsted, Id. at pages 153-156 and Mrs. Jessop Id. at pages 156-
160. 
The court allowed the hearsay conversations to be 
related over the objections of Defendant's counsel in each 
instance. See pages 162, 164, 153, and 156 of the hearing 
transcript. This was error under Utah law as can be seen from 
the Utah case of Butler v.Butler, 461 P.2d 727 (Utah 1969). In 
that case the trial court sustained an objection to hearsay 
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evidence where the witnesses were available. Like the Butler 
case, the Plaintiff, in the case at bar, made no showing as to 
why the actual witnesses could not testify,. Her self-serving 
statements seeking to justify her actions after the fact are 
highly suspicious and do not afford the court the opportunity to 
evaluate the witness1 credibility or reliability. The 
Plaintiff's testimony was extremely prejudicial to the Defendant, 
as he had no prior notice of her intention to quote witnesses not 
in the courtroom, and therefore, he did not have the opportunity 
to subpoena them and subject them to cross-examination. The 
testimony with regard to conversations with witnesses was also 
prejudicial in that it seemed to justify, at least in part, the 
Plaintiff's hasty actions in contravening her stipulation to 
leave custody with the Defendant for a year, when in reality, she 
may have had no justification. In spite of the fact that the 
Plaintiff subjected the children to "ping-pong" custody 
arrangements without notice or warning, the trial court found 
that no change of circumstances had occurred. His finding in 
this regard seems to have ignored the "ping-pong" custody issue 
in large part because of the Plaintiff's testimony of 
conversations seemingly justifying her actions. Based upon the 
Butler case, Defendant's counsel's objections to hearsay should 
not have been overruled. This case should be remanded for 
further hearing in conformance with the Butler case. 
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IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AMEND THE FINDINGS 
AS PER THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS 
The Defendant made a timely motion to amend the 
Findings to include statements made by the trial judge in his 
ruling from the bench after presentation of the evidence, and to 
eliminate other statements not made in his ruling. 
The Court's ruling included the following statements: 
I specifically find there has been no 
abuse of these two boys by either natural 
parent or by either step-parent. 
I also specifically find, for the 
purposes of this Court, without intending to 
undercut a finding and determination by 
another agency or another Court concerning 
Amy, but with respect to this Court I find 
that there was no abuse of Amy. 
Furthermore I find that there was no 
abuse of the foster child, Steven Slater. 
Ruling of the Court, page 2, lines 3-12. 
In light of this language, Defendant submitted its own 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and included 
that language in it. The Plaintiff objected to the Defendants 
proposed findings but did not object to that specific language. 
Therefore, it was error for the judge to deny the Defendants 
Motion to Amend the Findings to include that language. The 
Defendant's Motion to Amend Findings also objected to Plaintiff!s 
paragraph 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. As can be seen from the Courtf s 
ruling, these matters were simply not discussed. The Court 
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should have granted the Defendant's Motion to Amend in light of 
that fact. 
With regard to paragraph 8, the Court did not find that 
Isaiah's fears were concrete, real and pervasive and provided 
instead as follows: 
Isaiah's feelings about his stepmother may 
not be justified, but he has those feelings, 
nevertheless, and that's fairly clear from 
the interview with him. 
Ruling of the Court, page 3, lines 6-8. 
To find that Isaiah's feelings were "concrete, real and 
pervasive" is not supported by the evidence, and, therefore, the 
Court should have granted the Motion to Amend Findings. In light 
of the discrepancy between the Court's ruling and the Plaintiffrs 
proposed Findings of Fact, and in light of the Defendants 
objections, the Court should have granted the Defendant's Motion 
to Amend. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments and case law set forth above, 
the Defendant respectfully requests that this court reverse the 
Findings of the lower court and enter a finding that there is a 
substantial change of circumstances, and that it is in the best 
interests of the children to change custody from the Plaintiff to 
the Defendant. In the alternative the Defendant requests that 
the case be remanded for proper findings to be entered in 
conformance with Utah law, and that the findings be amended as 
prayed for by the Defendant in his Motion to Amend. 
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